Jumat, 26 April 2013
Myanmar’s Rohingya Dilemma*
Tin Maung
Maung Than & Moe Thuzar **
In
the past, the people who called themselves “Rohingya” had to contend with
successive military governments’ indifference to recognizing — or regularizing
- their status as persons living on the territory of Myanmar. The latest
incidence of anger against the Rohingyas, however, did not have immigration
woes at its source. An unfortunate crime of rape and murder — committed by
Muslim men against a Buddhist woman in a strongly nationalistic state —
escalated into communal violence fraught with racial and religious undertones.
The views, many of them inflammatory, on social media platforms indicate
deep-seated prejudices that threaten the unconsolidated stability in Myanmar
under President Thein Sein’s reform-minded administration.
President Thein Sein made a statement on 10 June to calm seething sentiments on the present conflict. Myanmar also received the visit of United Nations (UN) Special Envoy Vijay Nambiar to the conflict areas. The measures have resulted in lessening tensions somewhat, and won praise from the European Union and the United States[i]. Responding to questions by media, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi highlighted the importance of handling the situation with “delicacy and sensitivity” while also underscoring the need for the rule of law as “essential [..] to put an end to all conflicts in the country”.
President Thein Sein made a statement on 10 June to calm seething sentiments on the present conflict. Myanmar also received the visit of United Nations (UN) Special Envoy Vijay Nambiar to the conflict areas. The measures have resulted in lessening tensions somewhat, and won praise from the European Union and the United States[i]. Responding to questions by media, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi highlighted the importance of handling the situation with “delicacy and sensitivity” while also underscoring the need for the rule of law as “essential [..] to put an end to all conflicts in the country”.
However,
the Rohingya issue is still far from reaching a lasting solution.
The
Historical Context And Evolution Of The Conflict
Muslim
influence, through Bengal, in the Rakhine (Arakan) kingdom probably preceded
the first known settlement of Muslims at around 1430 AD. Thereafter, Rakhine
Muslims managed to preserve their own heritage within the Buddhist environment
for many centuries assuming a separate identity distinct from the majority
Buddhist Rakhine.
During
the colonial era, the porous western border saw a fair share of cross border
migration between British India (mainly Chittagong) and the Rakhine State of
Burma, which were provinces under the British Raj. During the Japanese invasion
of British Burma, chaos and anarchy enveloped Rakhine and communal violence
broke out. Internal displacements occurred as each community moved to places
where they were a majority and the state became somewhat divided, with the
Muslims concentrated in the northern part of the state. When Pakistan was
established, some Muslims in Rakhine called for a separate state. This did not
get support from Pakistani leaders.
Rebellion
broke out in April 1948, incited by some clerics who called for a Jihad against
the “infidels”. Known as the Mujahideen (warriors in a holy war) insurgency,
the rebellion faded away in the mid-1950s, but left a bitter legacy of
distrust and hatred between the two communities, further accentuating the
tensions resulting from the wartime violence.
It
was probably sometime during the late 1950s that the term Rohinga or Rohingya
(meaning dear ones or compassionate ones) came to signify the ethnic identity
of Muslims (both recent migrants and naturalized natives). The seeds of
ethno-nationalism were sown and the vision of a Rohingya nation persisted for many
decades to come. Meanwhile, it appeared that migration from Bengal continued
throughout many decades after Myanmar’s independence (at times encouraged for
political expediency during the parliamentary period) and that the ‘othering’
process (them and us) was perpetuated by both Buddhists and Muslims.
After
the Mujahideen were defeated, a plethora of small armed groups emerged under
the banner of self-determination for the Rohingyas. These groups, together with
exiled dissidents, and expatriate lobbies used the exodus of 1978 and 1991-92
to further the Rohingya’s cause and internationalise it. Capitalising on the
post-1988 enmity between the junta and the United States and Western
governments, this constellation of anti-regime groups attempted to turn the
Rohingya issue into a cause celebre by invoking human rights,
self-determination and democracy against a slew of allegations: repression,
religious persecution, rape as a terror weapon, forced relocation, forced
labour, extra-judicial killing, dispossession of land and livelihood and even
genocide.
The
exoduses of 1978 and 1991-92 were treated as an immigration issue between
Bangladesh and Myanmar by the military governments of the time. On both
occasions, the Foreign Ministers of both countries negotiated the process of
repatriating the refugees. Burma/Myanmar’s stance on both occasions was to
accept the refugees and displaced persons back on the basis of these persons’
ability to prove their residency status[ii]. Also for both occasions, UNHCR involvement
highlighted the humanitarian aspect of the situation. The UNHCR, acting as a
non-participant third party, also coordinated the repatriation process (of
refugees back to Burma). In both cases, the pace of repatriation, which
received initial high-profile international attention, were drawn-out affairs
lasting over several months, and with residual communities in both countries.
The
Rohingya were in the news again in 2009 when groups of Rohingya refugees in
boats reached the shores of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, after several
days at sea. Then Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s administration was
criticized for towing the boats with the Rohingya refugees out to sea to be
abandoned. ASEAN prevailed upon Myanmar to receive the refugees back, despite
cries of concern from rights groups over the safety and rehabilitation of the
returnees. ASEAN turned to the Bali Process — created in 2002 to move regional
cooperation on people smuggling and trafficking in persons — to do this. ASEAN
had counted on the precedent of the tri-partite collaboration under the Cyclone
Nargis relief effort to promote cooperation between Myanmar and the
international community on the Rohingya issue, and saw the Bali Process as a
“viable option” to discuss the issue. As Myanmar stated that anyone who could
prove their citizenship would be readily accepted back[iii], the ASEAN Secretariat was tasked with conducting a
census of Myanmar Muslims in countries such as Indonesia, India and Thailand[iv].
The
recent communal violence in Rakhine state have brought renewed attention to the
Rohingya issue. The rape and murder of a Buddhist woman by Muslim men on 28 May
was the trigger event. These men have now been tried and sentenced by a
regional court, and a commission of inquiry has been formed. Before this could
happen, however, a Buddhist mob took justice into its own hands six days after
the rape incident, killing ten Muslim men travelling on a bus. The ten men were
pilgrims from other parts of Myanmar, and not from Rakhine. The razing of residences
— and even public buildings — prompted President Thein Sein to appeal to the
country on 10 June 2012[v]. The President also declared a state of emergency
in Rakhine State. The local government in Rakhine State had earlier imposed a
curfew on 6 June 2012. The clashes were characterised in the international
media as sectarian violence between Buddhists and Muslim Rohingya. The Rohingya
were depicted as a minority ethnic group. This prompted an explosion of
comments and repartees in the Burmese social media forums — many inflammatory —
accusing the international press of biased reporting in favour of the Rohingya.
Myanmar
has restrictions against reporting on religious and racial issues. Such stories
are required to be submitted to the censorship board. The Chief Minister of
Yangon Region Government told private media journalists on 10 June that they
faced seven years’ imprisonment under the Emergency Provision Act if news
articles on the issue had “inciting news that could worsen the situation”[vi]. This is seen by many in the media community as a
setback to the progressive steps taken towards press freedom and the
dismantling of the censorship board.
Myanmar
showed no reluctance in admitting Vijay Nambiar, the UN’s Special Advisor on
Myanmar, to visit on 13 June the areas where violence had flared. He called for
“a full, impartial, and credible investigation of the disturbances to be
conducted urgently as well as to ensure that the rule of law is enforced in a
transparent manner,” according to a UN news release[vii]. Also on 13 June, Tomás Ojea Quintana, the UN
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar visited the affected areas with
Myanmar’s Border Affairs Minister[viii].
UN
relief agencies — including the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the office of
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) — have been on the ground in
Rakhine, in response to the humanitarian situation caused by the communal riots
and clashes. Government ministers and officials were also actively involved in
relief and resettlement efforts. The Bangladesh government has stated their
position of keeping the border closed[ix]. There were expectations that the Rohingya issue
will be discussed when President Thein Sein visits Bangladesh in July.
The Rohingya issue is a complex problem. In light of recent
events, the essence of the issue can be described as a clash of two contending
interpretations over the perceived “overwhelming” presence of Muslims in
Rakhine. From the pro-Rohingya perspective, they are descendents of Muslim
settlers, with many ethnic roots, who arrived long before the British annexed
Burma and Arakan (now called Rakhine). Their view is that the Rohingya should
be accorded the status of a separate ethnic group in Myanmar. In contrast, the
official view maintains that they (the Rohingya) were never part of the
indigenous national races but were migrants from Bengal and beyond, who arrived
after the Anglo-Burmese War of 1824. As “illegal” immigrants, they do not
qualify for citizenship.
The Rohingya And The Citizenship Laws[x]
The
1948 Union Citizenship Act offered a window for dealing with issues of
citizenship in the newly independent Burma. Based on the 1947 Constitution[xi], the Act specified that indigenous races of Burma
meant the “Arakanese, Burmese, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon or Shan race and
racial groups as have settled in any of the territories included within the
Union as their permanent home from a period anterior to 1823 AD (1185 BE)”.
Anyone in doubt of their rights to citizenship could apply — through the
different administrative layers, by 30 April 1950 — to the Minister of Home
Affairs for decision.
Had
the Union Citizenship Act been effectively implemented in the years following
Burma’s independence, it might have resulted in a clearer legal status for
everyone in the country. This did not happen as independence brought with it
other concerns perceived as more pressing for the nascent government.
A
new legislation on citizenship was introduced under the context of the 1974
Constitution during the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) years. The 1982
Citizenship Law had its origins in views expounded by the BSPP Chairman and
then President of Burma, U Ne Win, in December 1979. His view — apparently a
long-standing one in governing circles in Burma — was that the security of the
state required clarification of the different kinds of persons residing in the
country: genuine Burmese; persons of mixed blood, i.e. Burmese-Indians/Chinese;
and those “allowed” to enter and reside in the country, i.e. Indians and
Chinese. Of these, those of mixed parentage could not be “fully trusted” due to
their alleged foreign contacts and possible external leanings and interests.
The 1982 Citizenship Law categorizes citizens into 1) full citizens, who are
either descendants of those residing in the country since before 1823,
including the indigenous races listed in the 1948 Citizenship Act, citizens at
the time of the legislation’s entry into force or those born of parents at
least one of whom were citizens at the time of birth; 2) associate citizens who
had applied for citizenship under the 1948 Citizenship Act; and 3) naturalized
citizens, who comprise persons “who have entered and resided in the State
anterior to 4th January 1948, and their offsprings born within the State may,
if they have not yet applied under the union Citizenship Act, 1948, apply for
naturalized citizenship to the Central Body, furnishing conclusive evidence”[xii]. After three generations, descendants of associate
or naturalized citizens would be considered full citizens.
The 1982 Citizenship Law can be interpreted as a barrier to
citizenship for many people who do not satisfy the criteria thereof. Under this
law, a “Central Body” comprising the Minister of Home Affairs (as Chair), and
the Ministers of Defence, and Foreign Affairs (as members), has the authority
to decide.
Challenges Ahead
The Rohingya issue is a serious test for Myanmar’s reform process.
President Thein Sein had first announced in May 2012 a second phase of the
reforms. In his statement of 10 June[xiii]
on the Rakhine riots, he referred to this second phase as “people-centred
reform strategies”. He also accepted full responsibility (on the part of the
government) for “addressing difficulties, issues and desires of the people
reasonably”. In a nationally televised speech on 19 June providing details on
the second wave of reforms, he promised to continue work on “national
reconciliation, national peace and stability and the rule of law, and the
safety of the public.”[xiv]
Human development (and security), national reconciliation and the rule of law
thus seem to be the central ingredients for the people-centred reforms.
Similarly,
the importance of the rule of law has been consistently emphasised by Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD). In the wake of the
violence in Rakhine, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi referred to the need for the rule of
law, including clear and precise laws with regard to citizenship.
The
Rohingya issue may prompt a revisiting of the 1982 Citizenship Law. However,
the deep anti-Rohingya sentiments in the country needs to be overcome. A window
may exist in the upcoming census planned for 2014 in partnership with the UN.
The preparatory discussions highlighted inclusiveness of the census of all the
territories of Myanmar[xv]. This would enable President Thein Sein’s
people-oriented reforms to address the gaps and omissions of past
administrations[xvi].
The
recent communal violence in Rakhine state may be seen by some as a flare-up of
emotions that government interventions can contain (for the present). A more
pessimistic view indicates a deep division within the population that could
worsen. Whichever the case, conflicts of this nature highlight the need for
“bridge-builders” and for building capacities of such individuals and
organisations. Civil society in Myanmar has taken some initial steps towards
this difficult role. In addition to government relief efforts, some civil
society groups and individuals have offered relief assistance to people
displaced by the conflict regardless of whether they are Buddhist or Muslim,
Rohingya or Rakhine. The role of political parties in Rakhine State and
legislators of these parties in the regional and central-level parliaments is
also crucial. However, it will take decades to undo negative perceptions.
*
The Irrawaddy’s Aung Zaw has also written on the topic with
a similar heading “Burma’s Rohingya Dilemma” (Article in The Irrawaddy, June
14, 2012).
** Tin Maung Maung Than is a Senior Research Fellow at ISEAS and
coordinator of its Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme. Moe
Thuzar is an ISEAS Fellow and coordinator of the Myanmar Study Group. These are
their personal views.
Sumber: ISEAS
Perspective is published electronically by
the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
[i] The
EU High Representative’s spokesperson Maja Kocijiancic on 11 June stated that
“We believe that the security forces are handling this difficult inter-communal
violence in an appropriate way. [..] We welcome the priority with which the
Myanmar Government is giving to dealing with all ethnic conflicts.” (Reuters,
11 June 2012, “EU welcomes ‘measured’ response to rioting”) On 19 June the US
Charge d’Affaires in Myanmar stated that the government’s response to the
situation, including asking for international help was “a very different and
better response” that was “far and away better than Cyclone Nargis”. He also
stated that “This is something we would not have seen in the past. The
government is trying to help everybody who needs it whether that is Rakhine
Buddhists or Muslims”. (Weekly Eleven News bi-weekly e-version, citing a Reuters
report of 19 June).
[ii] For
the 1991-92 exodus, Myanmar agreed to accept returnees if they could state
which village they resided in and who were their neighbours.
[iii] At
the ASEAN Summit in March 2009, the Myanmar Foreign Minister also stated that
the refugees would be allowed to return but only if they identified themselves
as “Bengalis” rather than Rohingyas. (The Irrawaddy, March-April 2009, Vol. 17
No.2, p 19)
[iv] “Asia:
Regional approach to Rohingya boat people”, Integrated Regional Information
Networks —IRIN, 2 March 2009
(http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRIN,,MMR,,49af987bc,0.html )
[v] The
death toll (including the rape victim and the 10 Muslim men) now stands at 62
in the period over 28 May to 21 June, according to a local government official.
(Xinhua, 21 June 2012, “Death toll rises to 62 in Myanmar’s riot-hit Rakhine
state: official). Over 2000 residential homes and at least a mosque were also
destroyed during the riots.
[vi] Eleven
Media Group, “Chief Minister warns journalists about their news reporting in
Rakhine state”. See also Reuters article in Asahi Shimbun “Violence tests
Myanmar’s media and its censors”, 14 June 2012.
(http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/south_east_asia/AJ201206140093)
[vii] “UN
envoy calls for investigation into disturbances in Myanmar state”, UN News
Centre, 15 June 2012
(http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42240&Cr=myanmar&Cr1= )
[viii] “Myanmar:
UN ready to assist Rakhine displaced”, IRIN humanitarian news and analysis, 15
June 2012
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95658/MYANMAR-UN-ready-to-assist-Rakhine-displaced
[ix] “UN
responds to humanitarian needs in Myanmar following recent violence”, UN News
Centre, 19 June 2012 (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42271&Cr=myanmar&Cr1=#)
[x] The
background information in this section is mainly from Robert Taylor’s chapter
on The egal Status of Indians in Contemporary Burma in K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani
(eds) “Indian Communities in Southeast Asia” (ISEAS, 1993).
[xi] Section
11 of the 1947 Constitution specified that citizenship was granted to every
person, both of whose parents belonged to any of the indigenous races of Burma
and were/would have been citizens of the Union; every person born in any of the
territories included within the Union if their grandparent(s) belonged to any
of the indigenous races of Burma; and every person born in any of the
territories which at the time of birth was included within the British
dominions and who had resided in any of the territories included in the Union
for a period of not less than eight years in the ten years immediately
preceding the date of the commencement of the Constitution or 1 January 1942.
More importantly, recognition was given to the intent to reside permanently in
the Union, thus signifying the choice to be a citizen of the Union.
[xii] The language is as stated in the 1982 Citizenship aw.
Applicants for naturalized citizenship are required to be of 18 years of age,
to be fluent in one of the national languages, be of good character and be of
sound mind
[xiv] “Myanmar
President Announces Economic Reforms” by Thomas Fuller, 19 June 2012, in the
New York Times global edition.
[xv] “Burma
Census Planning Underway”, Mizzima News, 3 May 2012
(http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/7051-burma-census-planning-underway.html).
[xvi] Even with
an inclusive census, it may well nigh prove impossible to differentiate
descendents of the early settlers (who might qualify for citizenship under the
1982 law) and latecomers who are now collectively labeled as “Bengali Muslims”.
It should also be noted that prior to the 2010 elections, temporary identity
cards were issued to a number of Rohingya in Rakhine.
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